The California Supreme Court recently clarified the standard of causation in workers’ compensation death cases. Recognizing the different causation standards in tort law and the workers’ compensation system, the court in this case determined the contributing factor standard as the appropriate link in work-related injuries.The devastating facts of this case demonstrate that Brandon Clark, 36 years old, fell 8-10 feet while working as a carpenter for his employer. As a result, he suffered neck and back injuries, as well as a concussion. Mr. Clark’s workers’ compensation doctor then prescribed medication to treat his injuries, including antidepressants and pain relievers (Elavil, Neurontin, and Vicodin). Mr. Clark’s personal doctor additionally prescribed an anti-anxiety medicine and a sleep aid (Xanas and Ambien).

Months following the accident, Mr. Clark was pronounced dead when his wife was unable to wake him. He had various drugs in his blood, and his autopsy concluded the death was accidental, the combined effect of some of the drugs he had taken. The issue was which drugs contributed to his death, to what degree, and why were certain drugs prescribed.

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In a recent case certified for publication in part, the California Court of Appeal held that the prejudgment interest should apply only to damages in a personal injury lawsuit, and not to costs. The court also rejected the defendant’s claims of error concerning the jury instruction and the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff’s trial counsel.

Eric Lazear, an employee of Pacific Coast Elevator Corporation, collided with Daniel Bean’s truck while Mr. Bean was stopped at a red light. Mr. Bean suffered serious injuries and sued Pacific Coast. Mr. Bean was awarded $1,271,594.74 in damages, including $126,594.74 in economic damages and $1,145,000 in noneconomic damages. The trial court granted Mr. Bean’s motion for prejudgment interest and awarded him $34,830 in costs.

On appeal, Pacific Coast claims that the jury’s noneconomic award is excessive, that the trial court erred in its jury instructions, and that Mr. Bean’s counsel committed misconduct during the trial. Pacific Coast also contends that the trial court erred in their award of prejudgment interest on costs.

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In this case, the plaintiff, Mr. Cline, suffered severe injuries when his motorcycle collided with a car driven by a teenager with a provisional license. Mr. Cline and the driver (and his parents) settled for the limit of their insurance policy, $100,000.00. Mr. Cline then executed a release, effectively releasing the driver and his parents, and “any other person, corporation, association, or partnership responsible in any manner or degree,” from further liability for the accident.Mr. Cline then sued the driver’s grandmother, the sole adult in the car with the teenager at the time of the accident, for negligent supervision. Ms. Homuth, the defendant grandmother, asserted the release as an affirmative defense and moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and a trial took place, centering on whether the release was valid and whether Ms. Homuth was an intended third-party beneficiary of the release.   The trial court found the release was to Ms. Hough’s benefit, and she was entitled to enforce it.

On appeal, Mr. Cline argued the extrinsic evidence showed Ms. Homuth is not an intended beneficiary of the release.   The appellate court first turned to the facts of the case. After the accident in which Mr. Cline was severely injured, his attorney made a demand to the insurance company that provided coverage for the teenage driver’s parents. Since Mr. Cline’s medical expenses exceeded the policy limits, the insurance claims representative deemed payment of the policy limit appropriate.

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In reviewing a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, the California Court of Appeal held that the defendant’s due process right to cross-examination was violated when the plaintiff employee refused to respond to cross-examination. In this case, the appeals court focused on the importance of cross-examination, especially as a tool to help determine the credibility of a witness.

In 1996, Mr. Ritzhoff injured his right ankle, right hand, back, and psyche while working as a banquet server for the defendant.   The Workers’ Compensation Judge determined that Mr. Ritzhoff was permanently and totally disabled, relying on the opinion of his treating psychiatrist.

The defendant paid temporary disability payments, and a hearing took place to determine whether Mr. Ritzhoff was temporarily psychiatrically disabled. At this hearing, on cross-examination, Mr. Ritzhoff admitted working since his injury.

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In a recent California Court of Appeal case, the court determined that a triable issue remained regarding a fitness club’s gross negligence in failing to maintain an exercise machine responsible for a serious injury to a gym member. While the lower court had granted summary judgment for the fitness club, the appellate court found that the evidence demonstrated triable issues, defeating the summary judgment claim.

In this case, plaintiffs Stacey and Ruben Chavez appealed the trial court judgment in favor of 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (24 Hour). They sued 24 Hour for premises liability, ordinary and gross negligence, and strict products liability after Mrs. Chavez suffered a traumatic brain injury while exercising at the fitness center. 24 Hour moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted their motion.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued there was a triable issue regarding whether 24 Hour was grossly negligent. Gross negligence is defined as an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct. This form of negligence shows such a lack of care that it may be presumed to show a passive and indifferent attitude toward results.

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In a recent California Court of Appeal case, involving a vehicle collision, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict that only one of the two defendants’ negligence was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s injuries.

In this case, two vehicles collided in an intersection in Fountain Valley. The traffic light was turning from green to yellow to red as westbound defendant Faith Ciolek began a left turn. Defendant Nathan Heacox entered the intersection, traveling east and intending to proceed straight through. After colliding, Mr. Heacox’s car veered southeast, striking plaintiff Omar Bermudez, who had been on the sidewalk next to his bicycle.

In a special verdict, the jury found both defendants negligent, but Ms. Ciolek was the substantial factor causing harm to Mr. Bermudez. She was responsible for Mr. Bermudez’s $3,751,969 in damages. Ms. Ciolek argues the verdict is inconsistent. Alternatively, Ms. Ciolek claims she is entitled to a new trial on damages, since there is insufficient evidence of the reasonableness of Mr. Bermudez’s medical damages.

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In a recent California Court of Appeal case, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a case involving a fatal car accident. The plaintiffs, Miriam Navarette and her three children, sued defendant Hayley Meyer, alleging a violation of Vehicle Code Section 2170 (willfully interfering with the driver of a vehicle, affecting the driver’s control of the vehicle) and civil conspiracy. Allegedly, as a passenger in a vehicle, Meyer told the driver to speed over a road that Meyer knew would cause the car to become airborne, resulting in the death of Navarette’s husband. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Meyer. They found that there was no evidence suggesting Meyer’s act of telling the driver to drive faster affected his control over the vehicle, and no triable issues of material fact existed as to either cause of action.

In this case, Meyer’s friend drove Meyer and another passenger to a nearby drugstore, with Meyer in the front passenger seat. Meyer told the drive to turn onto a shortcut, which happened to be a residential street with a 25 mile-per-hour speed limit. Earlier that day, Meyer had been on this particular street and knew it had dips that would cause the car to become airborne, if the car traveled at a high rate of speed.

While the driver turned onto the road, Meyer told him the dips were fun and he should speed over them. Meyer told him to “go faster,” and the driver accelerated, such that he caught air from the dips and lost control of the car. The car veered sharply to the right, colliding with Navarette’s parked vehicle while her husband was attempting to put a child into a car seat. Navarette’s husband was killed by the impact. Meyer admitted it was her idea to drive fast on this road.

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In a recent premises liability case, the California Court of Appeals reviewed a judgment in favor of a hospital. On appeal, the issue was whether the hospital’s conduct in mopping a floor and failing to warn, resulting in a slip and fall injury, consisted of professional negligence or ordinary negligence.   Under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), a claim for professional negligence against a health care provider must be brought within three years from the date of the injury, or one year from the discovery of the injury, whichever came first. An ordinary negligence claim provides for a statute of limitations of two years.

The plaintiff in this case alleged that, while walking to her private bathroom in the defendant’s hospital room, she slipped and fell on a recently mopped floor. There were no warning cones, although the floor was wet. The plaintiff knew of the alleged negligence but did not file her complaint seeking damages for personal injury until nearly one year later.

The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s action was time-barred. The trial court granted the motion and ruled the action was one for “professional negligence,” since the negligence was committed in the act of safeguarding a patient. The trial court found the claim fell under professional negligence because the defendant owed a duty to take appropriate measures for patient safety, rendering services for which the defendant is licensed.

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In a recent California Court of Appeals decision, Bean v. Pacific Coast Elevator Corp., 234 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (2015), an employee of the Pacific Coast Elevator Corporation reportedly crashed his vehicle into the plaintiff’s truck, which was stopped at a red light.

The plaintiff suffered serious injuries as a result of the car accident and sued the defendant’s employer. At trial, the jury found the defendant, as an agent of his employer, negligent, and it awarded the plaintiff $1,271,594.74 in damages, which included $126,594.74 in economic damages, and $1,145,000 in noneconomic damages. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial and granted the plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment interest and also awarded costs.

While not discussed in the case opinion explicitly, when an individual is involved in a car accident in the course of their employment, they can often be held accountable on behalf of their employer by the doctrine of respondeat superior. Respondeat superior means that the employer answers for the employee, in the legal sense of the term.

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A rollover car accident transformed into a medical malpractice action when a man seeking treatment for his injuries allegedly had a piece of glass left in his scalp over a period of several months.

In the case, Li v. Mojaddidi, Cal. Ct. App. (2015), the plaintiff was involved in a rollover car accident, as a result of which he suffered cuts to the left side of his body, face, and scalp. He was transported to the emergency room of a nearby hospital. A CT scan of the plaintiff’s brain was performed. A preliminary report regarding the scan stated that the plaintiff had a laceration to the scalp and an “embedded small foreign body.” While unknown at that time, the object was later determined to be a small piece of glass.

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